The Bush visit in perspective

CONVALESCING after an operation that kept me from my desk for the last three weeks I have been reading and listening, with a sense of bemused wonder, to the learned commentaries of our pundits on the Bush visit and the degree to which they felt the visit had fallen short of Pakistan’s legitimate expectations and exceeded by far the legitimate expectations of Kabul and New Delhi. For anyone who had followed the developments in Washington and in the region over the last few months nothing that happened was entirely unexpected.

President Bush learnt on the eve of his visit that his approval rating for the way he was handling his job stood at 34 per cent in the latest opinion poll. At a personal level, he was rated favourably only by 29 per cent. This was the lowest approval rating for any second term president since the days of Nixon. Charges of incompetence during the Hurricane Katrina crisis were reinforced by the revelation that he had not been honest in acknowledging the briefings he had received on the gravity of the situation.

Much more important for our part of the world, was the furore created in the American media about the purchase by Dubai Ports World of the rights to provide handling services at six of America’s most important ports. The White House had to acknowledge that the president had not known that his administration had approved the sale.

A belated defence of the decision was mounted by the administration which included a threat from the president to veto any bill that sought to cancel the deal, an offer by the company to subject the deal to a 45-day scrutiny and a plea that the cancellation of the contract would send wrong signals to the Muslim world, particularly the UAE, which had been a stalwart partner in the war on terror.

This fiasco which culminated in the cancellation of the purchase, added to the furore created by the Danish cartoons. A poll taken a few days after the Dubai Ports crisis showed that 34 per cent of Americans had heard unfavourable views of Islam being expressed, 33 per cent believed that Islam encouraged violence against non-Muslims and a full 58 per cent believed that there were more extremists in Islam than in other religions.

There is little doubt that even while the cartoons and Dubai Ports had aggravated matters, the rise in anti-Muslim feeling was initially prompted by the failure in Iraq and the rise in “Islamic terrorism”. Bush’s strong card since 9/11 has been his success or at least the pursuit of success in the war on terrorism. All the developments seemed to add to the perception created by the fiasco in Iraq that even on this count Bush was failing.

Afghanistan, initially, was viewed differently. Unlike Iraq, the US had the world’s support for its actions against the Taliban. Second, it seemed that political developments in Afghanistan were proceeding in the right direction and with far fewer problems than were being faced in Iraq. The last few months, however, had shown both a resurgence of terrorist problems and the emulation in Afghanistan of “suicide bomber” tactics being experienced in Iraq. Two hundred and twenty American servicemen were killed in Afghanistan, more than a 100 of them in the last 12 months, indicating the resurgence of the Taliban.

Bush cannot afford to have Afghanistan turn into another Iraq. He needs to burnish his anti-terrorism credentials with a victory against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban in this region. The continuing and worsening problems in Afghanistan can be attributed entirely to mismanagement and incompetence on the part of the Karzai government and a less than whole-hearted effort by the coalition forces in the battle against the Taliban.

That is the point Pakistan has tried to make. But this does not change the fact that Pakistan, as the most important ally in the war against terrorism, and which has apprehended more terrorists than any other country is expected to do “more”. American officials state this politely but the American press is far more blunt.

Consider the following excerpts from editorials in the two most influential newspapers in the United States written immediately after Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz had completed what we believed was a highly successful visit to the US in January. The Washington Post said “Ever since the war on terrorism began, this meretricious military ruler (President Musharraf) has tried to be counted as a US ally while avoiding an all-out campaign against the Islamic extremists in his country, who almost surely include Osama bin Laden and his top deputies... Al Qaeda has continued to operate from Pakistan, while the US and allied troops have been unable to pacify southern Afghanistan. More than 125 American soldiers have been killed there in the past year, many of them by militants crossing the border.”

The New York Times, in an editorial calling for “straight talk” with Pakistan, asked Bush to explain to the Pakistani people why a US air strike in Bajaur killed innocent Pakistanis and then went on to state that “He (President Musharraf) has also proved to be unable, or unwilling, to close down the sanctuaries that three different groups of terrorists — Qaeda, Taliban and Kashmiri — have established along three Pakistani borders...

“The most important of these to the United States are the safe zones that fugitive Qaeda leaders established after fleeing the Tora Bora caves in Afghanistan four years ago. It is inexcusable that a Pentagon already looking ahead to Iraq did not pour in enough American troops to block the escape of Osama bin Laden and his top deputies, the masterminds of the 9/11 attacks. Attacking them in wartime Afghanistan would have been far simpler, militarily and politically, than trying to catch up with them in tribal areas that even the Pakistani army can’t control. But that is where they are now, and where America’s war against them must be fought”.

These editorials as much as what had been stated earlier in private discussions spelt out one objective, perhaps the most important objective of the visit. To underline its importance President Karzai visited Pakistan, shortly before Bush’s arrival, and let it be known that he had handed over a list of 150 Taliban allegedly operating on Pakistan soil and had asked for Pakistan’s cooperation in apprehending them. It is, of course, possible that Karzai was acting on his own but it would appear reasonable to presume that he did what he did with the overt or tacit consent of the American and perhaps International Security Assistance Force commanders in Afghanistan.

What was the other objective of the visit to Pakistan? The newly appointed assistant secretary for South Asia and Central Asia said at his confirmation hearings on February 16 that “the president will also visit Pakistan in the coming weeks to broaden our relationship with this key ally in the war on terror and make clear that we are deeply committed to helping the Pakistani people recover from the devastating earthquake of last October. President Musharraf has made the important decision to move his country away from extremism and towards a future as a modern democracy, and we fully support him in this undertaking.”

This objective did not become part of American policy after September 11. The then deputy secretary Richard Armitage had said in August 2001 when the question of lifting the sanctions imposed on both Pakistan and India after the nuclear tests of May 1998 was being considered that “the United States is not interested in Pakistan becoming more under the influence of Afghanistan... There has to be a way out for Pakistan... We are going to try and play an effective role.”

Later in the same interview he talked about 140 million Pakistanis deserving “good governance” about meeting to talk to Pakistan about democracy and while acknowledging that the relationship with Pakistan could have an Afghanistan facet he emphasized that it would still be a relationship “in and about” Pakistan and not based against something.

Armitage was speaking against the backdrop not only of the perceived Pakistan-Taliban nexus but the fact that since 1999 the annual American report on global patterns of terrorism had identified our region rather than the Middle East as the main source of terrorism.

Commenting on the Armitage interview at that time I had said that “Armitage is saying is that it is not issues of foreign policy but issues of Pakistan’s domestic policy that are at this time of primary concern and the driving force behind the sort of relationship the United States is seeking with Pakistan”.

Pressing for more democracy in the Greater Middle East had been made a high priority American objective. It seems, however, that the Hamas victory in Palestine and the strong showing by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian elections — has given the Americans a pause. In a recent visit to Egypt Secretary Condoleezza Rice was far less strident than in the past about the need for democracy.

It was, therefore, not difficult to assess that during Bush’s visit to Pakistan the focus would be on the fight against internal extremism and on “good governance” rather than on the more “traditional” democracy. The New York Times editorial quoted above had also said that “One crucial reason General Musharraf gets so little pressure from the Bush administration about restoring democracy is the almost universal assumption in Washington that only a dictator can deliver Pakistani military cooperation”.

In his interviews before his departure for South Asia, President Bush referred to President Musharraf as his “buddy”. He agreed to spend a night in Islamabad — apparently against the advice of his security officials — to make less odious the comparison with his visit to India and stuck with this even after the killing of the US diplomat in Karachi. How difficult this decision may have been is highlighted by what his national security adviser is said to have told the American press before departure from New Delhi “Pakistan is both an ally in the war on terror and, in some sense, a site where the war is being carried about.” He also claimed that “at this point, people are comfortable that the necessary precautions are in place” but nonetheless, “this is not a risk-free undertaking.”

The Bureau for South Asia in the state department has been expanded to include the Central Asian states. Pakistan has felt that it shares with the US a common interest in providing the Central Asian states alternate transit routes. It is not without significance that while talking about the connections between Central Asia and South Asia or Central Asia and the Middle East the new assistant secretary for the region made no mention of this “common interest”.

Let me conclude this part by recalling that throughout the debate that raged in American security and scientific circles about the wisdom of the proposed nuclear deal with India it was acknowledged that even while Pakistan would try and make the case for similar treatment the A. Q. Khan episode made it certain that this was a non-starter. The US Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Burns who was the lead negotiator of the deal with India had the following to say about Pakistan’s aspiration for civil nuclear cooperation “despite our friendship for Pakistan, there have been proliferation problems of a quite serious nature over the last several years that would make this kind of deal impossible, and we’ve been very up front and direct with the Pakistanis in saying that.”

Against this backdrop was there any reason to expect more from the Bush visit? In the next article, I will detail what was known about American objectives with regard to India and Afghanistan and where exactly US-Pakistan ties rest today.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

WSF comes to Pakistan

LATER this month — from March 24 to 29 to be precise — Karachi will play host to an international gathering that will be a phenomenon not experienced before in this city. This will be the World Social Forum (WSF) that, according to the organizers, is expected to draw a crowd of 30,000 of whom 10,000 will be foreign participants.

It is not so much the size of the gathering — the 2004 Forum in Mumbai had attracted 130,000 people — but the concept and motive of this meeting that gives it such an exciting dimension.

The WSF was first organised in Porto Alegre in Brazil in 2001 by eight Brazilian civil society organisations which described it as an “open democratic space for debates of ideas and multiple and plural reflections on the development of alternatives” to the neoliberal policies, imperialist behaviour and globalisation that we are witnessing today. It is designed to be an antidote to the capitalist thrust that has come in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the socialist bloc.

The World Economic Forum held in Davos every January since 1971 has been perceived as a gathering of the world’s corporate and government elite — in the words of the Financial Times of London, ‘the masters of the world’ — to plot the future of corporate-led globalisation at the expense of the poor. The WSF was conceived as a counterweight to the WEF and to vindicate the conviction of the architects of the WSF that another world is possible. This alternate world is planned to be anti-imperialist, based on the solidarity of the people and on social justice.

As the capitalist forces began to gain momentum — the launching of the WTO in 1995 symbolised their strength — the forces of resistance emerged in different corners of the globe. The turning point came in 1998 when a proposal for a multilateral agreement on investments being discussed behind the scenes in the OECD was exposed. It would have, if signed, taken away decision-making power from elected governments and transferred it to unaccountable private corporations.

Given the dangers inherent in it to democracy, civil society organisations joined hands to defeat it. The same year the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC) was set up in France to promote measures to help citizens regain control over their political, economic, social and cultural life which was falling under the influence of the financial sector.

Later in 1999, the WTO’s summit in Seattle was scuttled by massive demonstrations by protesters from all over the world. At the time, it seemed that the dangerous march of a globalised neoliberalism could be stopped by creating resistance against it on a social level. After the first WSF ‘edition’ in 2001, a meeting has been held every year in January to coincide with the annual meeting of the WEF.

The issues which come up for debate and for which alternative strategies are discussed are diverse and inherently have a bearing on the poor. The proposed themes of the WSF at Karachi indicate the wide scope of the subjects to be covered. From imperialism, militarisation and armed conflicts the issues range to control of natural resources, trade, social justice, state and religion, development strategies, women and patriarchy and environment.

This year it was decided to make the WSF polycentric — that is, it was to be held in three places. Bamako (Mali) and Caracas (Venezuela) were the venue of the forum in January. Karachi’s moot was put off until March because of the October 2005 earthquake in the north. The idea of spreading out the gathering was to make it less unwieldy as it was in danger of becoming.

The participation had been going up and rose from 2,000 in the 2001 WSF to 155,000 last year. Hence the idea of dispersing the meetings was a sensible one. It has made the forum more accessible as has its unstructured format that is not hierarchical. There are scores of meetings, workshops, symposia and talks held simultaneously and participants can drift from one to another. The informal ambience gives the WSF a carnival-like atmosphere where people gather to express their views, to protest and to celebrate. It is like a people’s mela.

But appearances can be deceptive. The fact is that behind the light-hearted singing and dancing, the feasting and merrymaking at the street stalls, the bright and colourful atmosphere, the protest marches and rallies, and the serious discussions there is a process at work. There is a discourse and the rethinking of issues taking place while a bonding of ties and networking of activists that is also at work.

It has been suggested that the WSF should become a movement of all the participating movements to make the forum a deliberative world parliament. It would have a global structure. Its proceedings would consist of participatory politics. It would operate like a workers’ international or a radical democracy.

But these suggestions may not offer an ideal solution to the economic and social problems the poor face. Reforming its operation and structure is the minor issue. Thus Michael Albert has suggested that an effort should be made to emphasise the holding of local forums. Beginning at the town level which should form the foundation of the next tiers — country, continent and the world forum — the WSF should seek to entrust the decision-making of the local events to a locally determined leadership which should choose the leadership for the next higher level and so on. Although this would create a hierarchy to which many have objected, it seems to offer the only feasible option.

The bigger debate, however, centres on the strategy and content of the ‘alternative world’ that is sought to be created. The issues that have been raised are: should governments and political parties be allowed to participate; how should vital agendas be addressed collectively to allow a considered approach to emerge; will the alternative world emerge in the framework of a capitalist system? The WSF has many critics and they are not just from the Right. The WSF is criticized for being unrepresentative, disorganised and with no realistic agenda or strategy.

But the main objection that has now been voiced is that many of those seeking a change do not know what they are looking for. Naomi Klein, the author of No Logo who attended the first forum, writes, “After a year and a half of protests against the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the World Social Forum was billed as an opportunity for this emerging movement to stop screaming about what it is against and start articulating what it is for.” President Chavez of Venezuela where the WSF was held in January also expressed the same fear when he appealed for a serious political discussion and the need for direction.

Will it be possible for the WSF to evolve a direction to which the oppressed people of all continents will agree? The Forum is basically a collective of a large number of anti-systemic movements that are not seeking power within the modern world system but are in quest of a more democratic and egalitarian world. But the WSF has so far failed to formulate “a vision for an alternative to neo-imperial-liberalism” that is the need of the day. Even the socialists couldn’t do it when they were in power.

Hence the WSF will have to content itself by providing the open space — as well as moral support — to all the movements working for change. How each of them brings about this change will have to be determined by the leaders and participants of the struggle in different regions of the world.

If the WSF is to retain its vitality and dynamism it cannot sustain itself indefinitely on a negative diet of protests and demonstrations. Each chapter must evolve a plan of action to build an alternative system. Of course the moot at Porto Alegre, as it is planned for every other year, could provide the participants the opportunity to compare notes and draw moral strength.

Misuse of zakat money

CONSCIENTIOUS Muslims object to the system of zakat initiated by General Ziaul Haq and controlled by a regular government department. They have nothing against the collection of zakat and its disbursement among the needy, but they object vehemently to the purchase of staff cars, airconditioners and other bureaucratic perks from this money (which they consider a sacred trust) and, on this basis, consider the whole system as a travesty of Islamic injunctions.

I have no knowledge of how the zakat system operated in the times of the caliphs in Arabia or even the Mughal and other Muslim kings in India, but I am sure the functionaries entrusted with the collection and disbursement of zakat were not paid salaries out of these funds for performing their duties. So if you come to know that hundreds of VIPs and opulent hangers-on of a political regime and their families performed the hajj out of zakat money, without spending a penny of their own, what would be your reaction?

I shall not ask what the conscientious Muslims think of this profane exercise because it is rare that I come across that pious breed, not being one of them myself. But I am sure they must have read the reported proceedings of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in which the subject of free hajj on zakat money first came to light, and turning their faces towards God, may have exclaimed, “Ya Allah! What next will the Muslims of Pakistan think of by way of subverting the faith!”

This was more than ten years ago but like old skeletons in the cupboard has now been revealed. (This does not mean that other years have gone by without this kind of activity being pursued on zakat funds. The cupboard must be full of many annual skeletons). It has taken so many years because the process whereby financial discrepancies, irregularities and defalcations in government departments reach the PAC is necessarily long and devious, since all other kinds of audit, big and small, have to be exhausted before this high-powered body comes into the picture. The file cannot be closed without the matter reaching a satisfactory conclusion.

The point is, did the 316 persons, men and women, all Muslims, all educated and enlightened, with certainly more knowledge about the tenets and principles of Islam than I possess, think for a moment whether such a hajj was acceptable to the Almighty or not in the light of what they had been taught about Islam? I say this because, without being a scholar, I have known all my life that hajj becomes obligatory only when a Muslim has completed certain responsibilities as a good citizen and head of his family. Also that one has to incur the expenses from his own pocket.

But perhaps I am not being fair to the 316, who comprised 59 legislators/VIPs and 257 family members, close friends and other dear and near ones. Maybe they knew this even better than I do and were not bothered whether the hajj performed at somebody else’s expense, and especially out of zakat funds, was permissible or not. Maybe they were fully aware of the conditions attached to this Muslim pilgrimage and were just not interested in the spiritual aspect of the journey to the holy land, treating it only as a picnic arranged by a good friend who happened to be the prime minister of Pakistan, plus an opportunity to do some shopping in Jeddah.

I do not know how devoted to religion Ms Benazir Bhutto — the prime minister in this case — was. All regimes in Pakistan keep many advisers on Islamic affairs, and there is a full- fledged ministry of religious affairs always at hand to remove doubts of theology. Maybe one of the advisers, and even the ministry itself, had told her that by sanctioning a free hajj for the 316, which lay in her power, particularly when the money was coming from zakat funds at her disposal, she was entitled to the ‘sawaab’ that would follow. Mind you, this is just a conjecture, for I do not really know how her mind worked.

But work it did, as circumstances show, for she even sought and obtained the approval of the then president, Farooq Leghari, to this spiritual adventure. Why it was necessary to involve the president in a case pertaining to the misuse of zakat money, is something that I am not able to explain.

I wouldn’t like to think that she knew she was doing something wrong and therefore it would be safer if the head of state was also drawn into the picture. But today one is obliged to remark that Mr Leghari is hardly being sporting when he goes about claiming that BB never listened to advice coming from the Aiwan-e-Sadar, particularly if it was meant to limit her waywardness and arbitrary exercise of authority.

Actually the whole malady in Pakistan’s ‘unwritten’ system of government has been the inability, and even refusal, of prime ministers and other persons in power to curb their authority. They do not feel they are the top cat unless they can throw their weight about, make indiscreet monetary sanctions, approve unmerited appointments and let everyone in the country see that they are firmly entrenched on the country’s throne. This was also the weakness of Mian Nawaz Sharif, to appear more powerful than he really was, and that led to his downfall. Perhaps (I say perhaps) some noble but weak voice among the religious counsellors did pick up courage and advised PM Benazir Bhutto that it was iniquitous to spend zakat money on a pilgrimage that was more of a junket. But he must have been rudely silenced by the senior advisers who were experts in showing to our rulers a short-cut to paradise. But this does not absolve the former prime minister.

There is a short but happy postscript. Apparently it was decided later that the expenses of the free trip to the Hejaz should be recovered from the holiday-makers. I think those few who responded positively deserve to be named, for in Pakistan’s given conditions they would be as rare as comets. They are: former governor of Balochistan, General Imranullah Khan, ex-MNA Mian Riaz Husain Pirzada, ex-Senator Haji Noor Sher Khan and ex- MNA Rai Arif Husain. God bless them!