PROMOTION of economic welfare of people is an important objective which underpins liberal democracy. To be truly representative, democracy then has to be strengthened by holding periodically scheduled national elections in the country. The entire edifice is built as an expression of a modern state, a defined territory with the nation committed to progress and to participation of its citizens in this process.

Pakistan has not been very lucky in fulfilling this objective. Elections, for example, have been held several times during the last six decades to arbitrate, at least theoretically, divergent views and positions about striving for the goal, resulting in creating more divergence among the main political players.

In March 1954, elections were held in East Pakistan which set the stage for a denouement which was beyond expectation. The dispute about the place of Bengali as the official language of East Pakistan unleashed events which ultimately affected the framework and the nature of the state of Pakistan itself. In that election, the United Front of opposition parties routed the official Muslim League and turned it into an insignificant minority party in the province.

This situation set in motions some important developments which were obviously ignored by the leaders in West Pakistan. The final outcome of the fallout from the 1954 elections became clear with the 1970 elections when Awami League won 170 out of 172 seats for East Pakistan in the national assembly, with PPP gaining 81 seats in West Pakistan. According to the parliamentary convention, Awami League should have formed the government at the centre, which did not happen. The rest of the story, leading up to the break up of Pakistan is familiar to all informed readers and need not be repeated here.

The third fateful election took place in 1977 when Z.A. Bhutto was accused of massive rigging at the polls, resulting in long negotiations with the Pakistan National Alliance, being the alliance of various opposition parties, resulting in an agreement only to be thwarted by the military coup of General Ziaul Haq.

The fourth critical election took place in 1997 when PML-N won with a heavy mandate, as it became known in hindsight. As a result, powers of President Farooq Leghari were clipped, the NAB was let loose, Supreme Court building was attacked, and the Shariat Bill was pushed through the assembly, declaring Pakistan a truly Islamic state. The events around this mandate were still unfolding when General Musharraf declared his military coup and took over as supreme commander and then later as president of the country as well.

This brief survey seems to indicate as if Pakistan was established on some very unstable fault lines which were set in motion with each of these elections. This is a difficult question to answer. We need to note, however, that we are currently coping with the results of the 2008 general elections, which gave a majority of seats to the PPP and it has formed its government in alliance with some other political parties. After the passage of almost eighteen months since the elections, the PPP-led alliance is weak but holding on to power, and the main opposition is not in an 'explosion' mode, to upset the applecart. Mr Asif Zardari, president and co-chairman of the party is in a spot for various charges of misdemeanour.

The founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had argued that because Muslims were a nation, therefore they were justified to have a territory to promote their identity. In the areas of British India where they were in a majority they should establish their own autonomous political system. Underlining this claim was the assumption that in a united India after the departure of the British Muslims would be at the mercy of the Hindu majority. Autonomy was then associated with the opportunity to improve the welfare of the people of Pakistan and allow them to lead their lives according to the principles of their religion. At times, Jinnah used terms as Islamic welfare state, or welfare state based on principles of Islam, but did but not dilate on these phrases.

Jinnah also did not expound what he meant by Muslims being a nation, even though part of this nation was to be left behind in India after the partition. And then the independence of Bangladesh gave a further blow to the concept.

A culturally or religiously homogeneous community's claim to be a nation and as a nation to have a territory is not new, however. For guidance on this matter we need to refer to the modern European history where during the period from mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century this idea had received considerable attention, leading up to the declaration by the US President, Woodrow Wilson, affirming the right of self-determination for communities. Jinnah had a long sojourn in Europe during the thirties and he must have noticed the debates going on this issue.

Eric Hobsbawm, a well-known European historian, holds the view that a nation was not a spontaneous growth but an artefact. It had actually to be constructed. Extending this argument in the context of Pakistan, we need to invoke the concept of nation-state to accomplish this task. And drawing on European experience, liberal democracy can play an effective role in promoting progress and in allowing the people to participate in this progress.

The potential for this scenario exists, provided this time NRO does not become the new fault line to destabilise the country. The state of Pakistan is a legal entity created by the Indian Independence Act 1947. Its identity as a nation can be strengthened in the framework of representative democracy. There are many factors which would have to be taken into consideration in order to facilitate the fulfilment of this objective, and I would briefly focus on two of these factors to illustrate my point, as follows class structure of the society currently comprising the nation, and the role of universally accessible primary education in preparing the young to become responsible citizens.

Experience of advanced countries clearly indicates that the backbone of representative democracy has been the support of the bourgeoisie. In Pakistan, the preference of the rich is to have the state machinery that governs the least, apart from maintaining law and order and protecting property rights. It is only in that framework that they could maximise their power and perks; in the middle class, there is a vocal minority which would prefer authoritarian rulers emphasising stability and security at the cost of freedom, and they come from various professions including senior bureaucracy, information technology, medical practice, corporate executive, etc.

The horizon of the poor is usually confined to local conditions, to get justice from the wheelers and dealers at the regional and local levels. Politics of the left or of left-leaning agenda as well as trade union activities play from zero to negligible role in the country. These barriers can be overcome through a demonstration effect of a working liberal democracy, if the circumstances would allow it to function.

Concerning primary education, there is strong evidence to show that the social benefits of compulsory and universal primary education far, far exceed their social costs, as compared to higher levels of education. And in terms of the opportunity to inculcate national sense, no other alternative including the madressah can compete with what the free primary education can offer. Then why has Pakistan ignored this opportunity for the last sixty years? A short answer is that the present chaotic system suits the upper classes in the country.

izzud-din.pal@videotron.ca